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Scientists, philosophers, and even the lay public commonly accept that 
schizophrenia stems from a biological or internal ‘dysfunction.’ However, this 
assessment is typically accompanied neither by well-defined criteria for deter-
mining that something is dysfunctional nor empirical evidence that schizo-
phrenia satisfies those criteria. In the following, a concept of biological func-
tion is developed and applied to a neurobiological model of schizophrenia. It 
concludes that current evidence does not warrant the claim that schizophrenia 
stems from a biological dysfunction, and, in fact, that unusual neural structures 
associated with schizophrenia may have functional or adaptive significance. 
The fact that current evidence is ambivalent between these two possibilities 
(dysfunction versus adaptive function) implies that schizophrenia researchers 
should be much more cautious in using the ‘dysfunction’ label than they cur-
rently are. This has implications for both psychiatric treatment as well as public 
perception of mental disorders.
Keywords: Mental disorder, mental illness, function, dysfunction, schizo-
phrenia, natural selection, neural selection, psychiatry
1. Introduction
Biologically-oriented psychiatrists rarely question that schizophrenia 
stems from a neurobiological ‘dysfunction.’ This dysfunction is often 
characterized by colorful and imaginative locutions: The Broken Brain is 
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the title of a book on schizophrenia (Andreasen 1984), signifying that the 
schizophrenic brain is not in ‘good working order’ and needs to be ‘fixed.’ 
More eloquently, Heinrichs (2001) describes schizophrenia as the product of 
a ‘neurochemical tempest’: 
“Is schizophrenia really a kind of biological tempest, where tides of 
neurotransmitters crest and recede? Do substances with cryptic and 
unpronounceable names play havoc with patches of protein called 
receptors, and do they upset chemical balances in regions of the brain 
that control thought, feeling, and movement?” (ibid., 181). 
Here, neurotransmission in schizophrenia is likened to a malevolent storm 
at sea, which reflects, and explains, the uncontrollable and chaotic ‘storm’ 
of thoughts and feelings associated with schizophrenia. This, again, reflects 
the view that ‘all is not as it should be’ in the schizophrenic brain.
Such expressions permeate not only literature for popular audiences, but 
scientific literature on schizophrenia as well. It is unusual to read a scientific 
article on the biological basis of schizophrenia that does not at some point 
characterize the schizophrenic brain as beset by a ‘dysfunction,’ ‘failure,’ 
‘disability,’ ‘aberrance,’ ‘malfunction,’ ‘deficit,’ or ‘excess.’ All of these 
are clearly normative terms: they imply a norm, or standard, in relation to 
which the activity of the brain is assessed as deviant. Moreover, this devi-
ance is not merely statistical, but normative in the proper sense, because 
it supports the notion that the schizophrenic brain is malfunctioning or 
dysfunctional and not just different or unusual. The assumption that the 
brain of the schizophrenic patient is not working ‘as it ought’ or ‘as nature 
intended,’ then, is central to biological approaches to psychiatry. Tacitly or 
explicitly, much biological research in psychiatry is fueled by the desire to 
identify what has ‘gone wrong’ in the schizophrenic brain or how nature 
has ‘erred.’ 
Some philosophers and psychiatrists have even argued that mental disor-
ders should be defined or conceptually analyzed in terms of these internal 
or biological ‘dysfunctions’ (Klein 1978; 1999; Spitzer and Endicott 1978; 
Wakefield 1992; 1999; 2007; Spitzer 1999; Nesse 2007). Some have sug-
gested that such definitions be officially incorporated into professional 
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nomenclature and publications, such as the upcoming revisions of the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Dis-
eases (ICD) and the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (Rounsaville et al. 
2002; First 2007). Doing so would have significant implications both for 
the developing self-conception of psychiatry as well as for public percep-
tion, because it would canonize the view that the chief aim of professional 
psychiatry is to identify and correct these internal dysfunctions. Whether 
intentionally or not, such a conceptual reduction of mental disorders to bio-
logical dysfunctions may lead psychiatrists to neglect or ‘shut out’ therapeu-
tic approaches that emphasize cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, social, 
or environmental aspects of the disorder (Schacht and Nathan 1977, 1023; 
Kirmayer and Young 1999). 
On the surface, the assumption that mental disorders stem from biological 
dysfunctions appears to be confirmed by the fact that biological research 
has been successful at uncovering disparities between the brains of patients 
with schizophrenia and those of normal controls. Although no single anom-
aly is sufficient or necessary for schizophrenia – that is, there are no biolog-
ical differences that all and only persons with schizophrenia share (Heinrichs 
2001, 249) – there are nonetheless promising results that suggest that, in at 
least some cases, some of the diverse symptoms of schizophrenia, such as 
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech or behavior, affective flat-
tening or avolition (American Psychiatric Association 2000, 312), may be 
associated with genetic and neurobiological differences. Though there may 
be no unique and reliable biological indicator of schizophrenia, the diverse 
evidence of biological discrepancies cannot be ignored. 
However, one cannot infer validly from the fact that schizophrenia is 
associated with a biological dif ference, that this difference represents a 
biological dysfunction. There are three main reasons for exercising caution 
in this inference. First, just because something is different or unusual, that 
does not mean it is dysfunctional (e.g., Boorse 1977, 546). Left-handedness 
is statistically unusual but is probably not the result of a dysfunction, even 
if it has a distinct biological cause. Moreover, even if a biological condition 
is maladaptive, unfortunate, or inopportune, this does not mean that it is 
dysfunctional. It is unfortunate that childbirth is often painful but that does 
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not mean that normal childbirth is caused by a dysfunction of the female 
reproductive system (ibid., 547). By similar reasoning, it is often maladap-
tive for a person to suffer hallucinations or delusions, but that does not 
mean that the production of hallucinations is the result of some dysfunction. 
That represents a further claim for which independent empirical evidence 
must be adduced. 
Second, as Schwartz (2007, 383) points out, there are conventional ele-
ments involved in ‘drawing a line’ between the lower range of normal per-
formance for a given organ, on the one hand, and dysfunction, on the other. 
For example, how and where one ‘draws the line’ between the lower end of 
normal thyroid production, and hypothyroidism, depends partly on one’s 
assessment of how significant the negative consequences are of low thyroid 
production for important aspects of functioning. This is a judgement that 
leaves room for professional disagreement. That implies that something 
considered ‘dysfunctional’ in one scientific or medical context may be con-
sidered ‘non-dysfunctional’ in another.  
Third, even something that seems ‘dysfunctional’ on the surface may have 
adaptive or functional significance (Richters and Cicchetti 1993, 15; Rich-
ters and Hinshaw 1999, 442-443). For example, the diagnostic criteria for 
conduct disorder (APA 2000, 93-99) include aggression, deceitfulness, and 
rule-violation. (Conduct disorder is primarily diagnosed of children or ado-
lescents; antisocial personality disorder is reserved for adults, but many of 
the diagnostic criteria are shared by both categories.) As Richters and Cic-
chetti (1993) point out, if a child or adolescent expresses antisocial behavior 
patterns, such as anger, defiance, and oppositionality, this may suggest the 
presence of a dysfunction, but it may also implicate a developmental con-
text in which those behaviors and attitudes were differentially reinforced, 
such as a war zone. Relative to the latter context, the behaviors in question 
should be considered ‘functional’ given the background in which they were 
formed. 
Similar examples can be found on the neurobiological level. For example, 
if a person loses sight in one eye at an early age owing to an accident or 
trauma, the brain will compensate by retaining more neuronal connections 
between the functioning eye and the visual cortex (e.g., Kaas 1991). This 
has the consequence of bestowing greater powers of visual discrimination 
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upon the functioning eye. Anatomically, such brain structures appear highly 
unusual, yet they have obvious functional and adaptive significance for the 
individual, given that individual’s unfortunate life circumstances. By anal-
ogy, it may be that some of the neurobiological differences associated with 
schizophrenia have important adaptive or functional significance, given a 
context of unusual or adverse life experiences. For these reasons, one should 
remain cautious in concluding that mental disorders such as schizophrenia 
necessarily stem from biological dysfunctions. 
It is appropriate to provide some clarification of the relevant sense of 
‘dysfunction’ at issue in this paper. There are at least three important senses 
in which a trait is said to ‘dysfunction.’ In one sense, ‘dysfunction’ is con-
strued as a type of ‘internal breakdown,’ ‘defect,’ or deviation from optimal, 
typical, or evolved ‘design.’ For example, multiple sclerosis involves dam-
age to the myelin sheath and prevents myelin from carrying out its function 
of conducting impulses. This represents a dysfunction of the myelin, regard-
less of whether multiple sclerosis is an autoimmune disorder, pathogen 
mediated, or influenced by genes. Similarly, Duchenne muscular dystrophy 
is due to a mutation that prevents the dystrophin gene from carrying out its 
function of producing the dystrophin protein. As a consequence, the dys-
trophin gene is ‘dysfunctional’ because it cannot perform its function due 
to a structural alteration. This is the type of dysfunction typically sought by 
biologically-oriented psychiatric researchers. It is also the sense that will be 
at issue in this paper. When it is questioned whether schizophrenia stems 
from a ‘dysfunction,’ it is dysfunction in this sense of ‘internal breakdown’ 
that is implied.
In another sense of the term ‘dysfunction,’ something can fail to function 
because it has been placed in an ‘uncooperative environment,’ that is, an 
environment that falls outside of its normal or historical range, as a conse-
quence of which the resources necessary for its proper functioning are not 
present.1 In a dark room one’s eyes are unable to carry out their function 
of seeing, even though they are not dysfunctional in the sense of an ‘inter-
1 The distinction between these two different senses of dysfunction is developed 
in Dretske (1986) and Neander (1995), and will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 2.2. 
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nal breakdown.’ If a person is submerged in water, his or her lungs cannot 
perform their function of distributing oxygen throughout the body. At least 
initially (a short time after submergence) the lungs are not dysfunctional in 
the sense of an internal breakdown but are simply unable to carry out their 
function due to an abnormal environment. (Of course, extended submer-
gence will result in the inhalation of water, which causes lung injury, which 
is a type of ‘internal breakdown.’) The distinction between these two senses 
will be developed in Section 2.2. However, in the following the term ‘dys-
function’ will be reserved for the first sense (i.e., internal breakdown). The 
second sense of ‘dysfunction’ will be referred to instead as the ‘inability to 
function owing to an abnormal environment.’ 
There is a third sense of ‘dysfunction’ relevant to psychiatry according to 
which an individual’s behavior or dispositions are ‘dysfunctional’ because 
they give rise to maladaptive or harmful consequences, either for the indi-
vidual or his or her social group. For example, the characteristic symptoms 
of antisocial personality disorder are clearly dysfunctional in this sense 
because they typically have harmful consequences for the individual such 
as the inability to hold down a job or maintain long-term friendships. How-
ever, the fact that antisocial personality disorder is dysfunctional in this 
latter sense (or ‘socially dysfunctional’) does not imply that it represents a 
dysfunction in the sense of an ‘internal breakdown.’ It may be that in some 
individuals, the characteristic behaviors associated with antisocial personal-
ity disorder represent an adaptive response to an unusually hostile environ-
ment, in which case they would not be dysfunctional in the sense of an 
‘internal breakdown.’ This final sense of dysfunction as ‘social dysfunction’ 
will not be used in this paper. It is sufficient to point out that a pattern of 
action may be socially dysfunctional without stemming from a dysfunction 
in the sense of an internal breakdown. Political activism can be dysfunc-
tional in the sense of ‘socially dysfunctional’ even if it does not stem from 
an internal breakdown (e.g., a neurobiological or genetic dysfunction; see 
Spitzer and Endicott 1978, 28). 
When it is questioned, then, whether schizophrenia stems from a dysfunc-
tion, what is in question is whether it is ‘dysfunctional’ in the first sense, 
namely, that it represents some sort of ‘internal breakdown.’ Clearly, schizo-
phrenia is usually dysfunctional in the sense of socially dysfunctional. It 
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is possible that schizophrenia is dysfunctional in the second sense, namely, 
that it involves an adaptation to an unusual environment as a consequence 
of which certain functions associated with the normal environment cannot 
be performed. 
The following is divided into four main sections. Section 2 examines 
recent philosophical work on the concept of biological function and intro-
duces two distinctions that are useful for interpreting empirical models of 
schizophrenia. Section 3 describes one particular model of schizophrenia 
which holds that schizophrenia is the result of synaptic ‘pruning’ mecha-
nisms that affect the neurotransmitter glutamate. It argues that current evi-
dence does not warrant the claim that the glutamate system in schizophrenia 
is dysfunctional, and argues that the evidence could, with equal facility, be 
taken to suggest that it is functioning adaptively in the face of adverse life 
events. The fact that the evidence is ambivalent between these two readings 
(dysfunction versus adaptive function) implies that schizophrenia research-
ers should be much more cautious in using the ‘dysfunction’ label than they 
currently are. The final section (Section 4) develops implications for both 
the treatment and public perception of schizophrenia. 
2. Biological Functions and Dysfunctions
An enormous amount of philosophical work on the concept of biologi-
cal function and dysfunction has been published over the last 40 years (see 
Garson 2008 for a comprehensive survey). The majority of philosophers 
participating in the debate can be divided into two main camps – etiologi-
cal theorists and consequentialist theorists. According to the etiological (or 
‘backwards-looking’) approach to functions, a biological part or process 
has a ‘function’ because of the historical process that explains its current 
existence or form. According to the consequentialist (or ‘forward-looking’) 
approach to functions, a biological part or process has a function because of 
one of the effects or consequences it typically produces, rather than its his-
tory.  
To take a simple example, according to one etiological approach called 
the ‘selected effects’ theory, the human heart has the function of circulat-
ing blood because historically, circulating blood is what caused hearts to be 
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selected for by natural selection and therefore it explains why humans have 
hearts today (e.g., Neander 1983; 1991; Millikan 1984; 1989; Sober 1984, 
208; Brandon 1990, 184-189; Griffiths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Mitchell 
1995; Allen and Bekoff 1995; Schwartz 1999). According to one conse-
quentialist approach, the heart has the function of circulating blood because 
circulating blood contributes to the fitness of the organism that possesses it, 
regardless of its evolutionary history (e.g., Ruse 1971; Boorse 1976; Bigelow 
and Pargetter 1987; Horan 1989; Wouters 2003).
For the purpose of this article, a version of the etiological theory of func-
tions will be adopted. According to this theory, the function of a biological 
part or process consists in that activity which historically led to its dif-
ferential reproduction or dif ferential retention within a biological system. 
Roughly speaking, the function of a biological entity or process consists 
in the activity that it was ‘selected for.’ However, the expansive sense of 
‘selection’ embedded in this definition will be explicated in Section 2.1. The 
reason that an etiological theory of function rather than a consequentialist 
one is used is that it lends itself easily to the construction of a well-defined 
concept of dysfunction, while it remains controversial whether consequen-
tialist theories can be used to define ‘dysfunction’ (e.g., Millikan 1989, 294; 
Neander 1991, 181).  However, a similar conclusion (that schizophrenia 
cannot be reduced to a biological dysfunction) could be drawn even under 
a consequentialist theory of function (see Section 2.2). The conclusion 
regarding schizophrenia, then, does not rely exclusively on accepting one or 
another position in the controversial function debate.
Two important points about this etiological theory of function should 
be addressed before defining a corresponding notion of ‘dysfunction.’ The 
first concerns the expansive sense of ‘selection’ appealed to in the definition 
above (Section 2.1). The second concerns the distinction between dysfunc-
tion and the inability to function owing to an abnormal environment (Section 
2.2). 
2.1. A Generalized Version of the Selected Effects Theory
Many proponents and detractors of the selected effects theory have stated 
that according to that theory, natural selection operating at the level of the 
individual organism, and over an evolutionary time scale, is the only pro-
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cess relevant for the ascription of biological functions (e.g., Sober 1984, 
208; Brandon 1990, 186; Neander 1991, 174; Allen and Bekoff 1995, 612; 
Walsh and Ariew 1996, 497; Wouters 2003, 649-652; Lewens 2007, 533). As 
a consequence, it is widely assumed that the selected effects theory cannot 
ascribe functions in any direct manner to evolutionarily novel traits. The 
problem with this restrictive notion of ‘selection’ is that in order to deter-
mine whether or not a trait has a function, and which function it has, one 
would have to possess extensive knowledge about its evolutionary history. 
In particular, one would have to know that the trait was selected for by 
natural selection and what it was selected for. 
Unfortunately, the precise evolutionary histories of many of the psycho-
logical (and even biological) traits that psychiatrists are interested in are 
shrouded in mystery (e.g., Lewontin 1998). Despite the expansive claims 
of movements such as evolutionary psychology or evolutionary psychiatry 
(e.g., Buss 1999; Nesse 1999; Stevens and Price 2000), the evolutionary 
history of psychological traits such as sadness, anxiety, aggression, and so 
on, are not transparent to us. If functions are determined exclusively by 
evolutionary history, then many function ascriptions will appear, at best, 
unscientific, and at worst, as reflections of current social and ideological 
biases rather than biological reality (e.g., Gould and Lewontin 1979). This 
point has often been raised in the psychiatric context specifically against 
Wakefield’s (1992, 1993, 1999) attempt to identify the function of a trait 
with the activity that it was selected for by natural selection (see McNally 
1994, 205; Lilienfeld and Marino 1995, 413; Sadler and Agich 1995, 226-7; 
Sadler 1999, 435; Kirmayer and Young 1999, 449; Woolfolk 1999, 660; Bol-
ton 2001, 198-9; Murphy and Woolfolk 2001, 245; see Buss et al. 2002 for a 
response). 
Fortunately, there are other types of ‘selection processes’ in the natural 
world in addition to natural selection (Darden and Cain 1989; Cziko 1995; 
Hull et al. 2001). There are three in particular that are worth mentioning: 
neural selection processes, antibody selection processes, and selection pro-
cesses underlying some types of learning such as operant conditioning. 
These can satisfy the selected effects theory of functions and they oper-
ate over a much shorter time-frame (Wimsatt 1972, 15; Godfrey-Smith 
1992; 2009; Millikan 1984, 28; Papineau 1987, 66; 1993, 45; 1994). As a 
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consequence, it is not always necessary to explore or even speculate about 
the ancient evolutionary history of an organism in order to determine that 
certain parts or processes within it have ‘functions’ in this broader sense – 
a point often leveraged against the selected effects theory of function (e.g., 
Amundson and Lauder 1994, 356-61; Schlosser 1998, 323-4; Wouters 2005, 
144). The etiological theory of functions allows functions to emerge over 
the lifetime of an individual. This move substantially broadens the range of 
evidence that would be relevant to show that a given trait possesses a func-
tion. These three types of selection processes will be briefly described. 
First, there are neural selection processes that operate over an individual’s 
lifetime (Changeux and Danchin 1976; Edelman 1987). Along with other 
neurological processes, neural selection is responsible for sculpting the 
mature pattern of synapses in the brain. During early infancy, the human 
brain produces a ‘hyperabundance’ of neural connections. That is, it pro-
duces many more neurons and synapses than it will retain. From childhood 
through adolescence, many of these connections are removed or eliminated. 
This is also referred to as ‘synaptic pruning.’ The specific pattern of connec-
tions in the mature brain is largely due to the elimination of existing syn-
apses, although new synapses are continuously formed as well (Huttenlocher 
1979; Rakic et al. 1986). 
The crucial point is that which neurons are retained, and which are 
eliminated, is often due to a ‘competition’ between them. Neurons, like 
organisms, need external resources for growth and repair. Some of these 
resources are called ‘trophic factors’ and they depend on a neuron’s ability 
to synapse onto other neurons. That is, when a neuron A synapses onto a 
neuron B, some of the nutritive resources that A needs to sustain its form 
come from neuron B. When many different neurons form synapses with 
the same target neuron, they may compete for the trophic factors produced 
by that target neuron. Some of these neurons may be better positioned than 
others to exploit this trophic factor, and as a result, they tend to be retained 
as others are eliminated (see Figure 1). Neural selection has been shown to 
play a role in the formation of diverse neural structures such as the neuro-
muscular junction, ocular dominance columns in the visual cortex, brain 
regions underlying filial imprinting, and the structure of the olfactory sys-
tem in mammals (see Wong and Lichtman 2002 for a review). 
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Selectionist models are also used to explain the development of the 
immune system. According to the clonal theory of antibody production, cer-
tain antibodies are reproduced over others upon exposure to the correspond-
ing antigen (Burnet 1959; see Rajewsky 1996 for a recent review). Finally, 
some forms of learning, such as operant conditioning, can be modeled as 
selection processes. In operant conditioning, certain behavioral dispositions 
are reinforced over others by virtue of their performance on a common 
task. (McDowell 2009 gives a recent defense of what he calls ‘behavioral 
Darwinism’ and provides a formal comparison with ‘neural Darwinism.’)
All of these phenomena – natural selection, neural selection, antibody 
production, and operant conditioning – exhibit a similar basic process. Cer-
tain structures are reproduced over other structures, or retained over other 
structures, by virtue of their activity. This basic process establishes what 
Wright (1976, 113) called a ‘consequence etiology,’ in which certain effects 
produced by a structure explain the continued persistence of that structure. 
Moreover, such structures are selected for, that is, dif ferentially reproduced 
or retained over other structures. As a result, they should be taken to satisfy 
the selected effects theory of function.
This generalization of the etiological theory has a consequence, however, 
Fig. 1.  Innervation of skeletal muscle of newborn rats. The first panel depicts the 
multiple innervation of muscle fibers by motor neurons; the second panel 
depicts the one-to-one pattern of connections that emerges by two weeks 
after birth. Redrawn from Purves and Lichtman (1980, 155).
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that is crucial for assessing whether a given trait is functional or dysfunc-
tional: the fact that a given biological trait is structurally unusual, or that a 
given psychological trait is maladaptive or inappropriate, does not imply 
that it is ‘dysfunctional.’ An example from neuroscience can illustrate the 
point.  
In the 1960s, neuroscientists David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel famously 
carried out single-cell observations on the mammalian visual cortex (Wiesel 
and Hubel 1963; Hubel and Wiesel 1965). In some of these experiments 
(known as ‘monocular occlusion’ experiments) the scientists deprived new-
born kittens of visual stimulation in one eye for the first few months of life, 
and recorded electrical activity from single cells in the visual cortex. Two 
notable results emerged; one was expected and the other was unexpected. 
The expected result was the almost complete absence of neural connec-
tions between the visual cortex and the deprived eye as reflected in the 
impoverished width of the ocular dominance columns associated with that 
eye. The unexpected result was that the vast majority of visual neurons 
responded exclusively to stimulation of the non-deprived eye as shown by a 
corresponding thickness in the ocular dominance columns for that eye (also 
see Rakic 1976; Hubel et al. 1977). Effectively, the visual cortex had reor-
ganized itself in such a way as to enhance the discriminatory power of the 
functioning eye, and accrued new functions in the process. 
Crucially, the unusual thickness of the ocular dominance columns for the 
functioning eye is the result of a neural selection process. About 80% of the 
neurons of a kitten’s visual cortex are ‘binocularly-driven,’ that is, they are 
responsive to light coming in from either eye. However, when a newborn 
kitten is deprived of vision in a single eye for the first several months of 
life, most of the neurons in its visual cortex become ‘monocularly-driven,’ 
that is, responsive only to stimulation of the functioning eye. Unlike kit-
tens that have undergone monocular deprivation, however, kittens that have 
been exclusively dark-reared for the first several months of life appear to 
retain the same degree of binocularity as normal kittens. This implies that 
the results of the monocular-deprivation experiments cannot be explained 
by the assumption that connections from the deprived eye degenerate as a 
function of disuse. Rather, it implies that there exists some active ‘competi-
tion’ between the neural connections from the deprived eye and the non-de-
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prived eye (Wiesel and Hubel 1963, 1015) – that is, the loss of connections 
from one eye is a consequence of the activation of the other eye.
Now for a thought-experiment: suppose a neuroscientist were to encoun-
ter tissue samples from the kitten’s visual cortex but he or she knew nothing 
about the life experience of the kitten. He or she would probably be inclined 
to think that the gross neurostructural anomalies in the visual cortex (such 
as the unusual width of ocular dominance columns) represent a dysfunction. 
The truth is that the visual cortex is not dysfunctional, but can be said to be 
functioning adaptively in the face of the kitten’s adverse experience. This 
is because neural selection processes were responsible for generating novel 
functions in response to the unusual formative environment.2 This example 
illustrates the point that structural differences alone do not provide suffi-
cient evidence to infer the existence of a dysfunction. A biological trait may 
be structurally unusual precisely because it has been adapted to an unusual 
environment, and not because of some ‘internal breakdown’ or ‘defect.’
2.2.  Dysfunction and Inability to Function Owing to Abnormal Envi-
ronment
Secondly, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the 
case in which a biological part is dysfunctional, and the case in which it 
is unable to perform its function owing to an abnormal environment (e.g., 
Dretske 1986, 32; Neander 1995, 119-120).  For example, if one binds a per-
son’s legs with rope, the legs will be unable to perform their natural func-
tion of walking – but that does not mean they are dysfunctional. Rather, 
they are simply prevented from performing their function by unusual envi-
ronmental circumstances. More generally, for any given biological entity, 
X, and any function, F, the functional status of X with respect to F does not 
2 Of course, it may be that the unusual cortical structures in the case of monocu-
lar occlusion have functions because the visual cortex was selected for by natural 
selection to possess the sort of plasticity that it exhibits in this situation; this would 
be along the lines of Millikan’s distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘derived’ proper 
functions (e.g., Millikan 1984, 41-42; 1989, 288). However, the point of the above 
discussion is that this hypothesis, or any hypothesis regarding the evolutionary his-
tory of the visual system, is not necessary for determining that the unusual struc-
ture in question has a function. 
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merely fall under one of two mutually exclusive categories – functional or 
dysfunctional – but rather, one of three different categories: X has the func-
tion F and is capable of performing this function (functioning properly); X 
has the function F but is unable to perform F due to an abnormal environ-
ment; X has the function F but is unable to perform F where this inability is 
not due to an abnormal environment. 
The importance of this distinction can be illustrated by a neurobiological 
example relevant to psychiatry. This example also shows the need for cau-
tion in inferring that a particular biological system is ‘dysfunctional.’ Until 
recently, most biologically-oriented psychiatrists believed that schizophrenia 
– or at least some of its so-called ‘positive’ symptoms such as hallucinations 
or delusions (as opposed to ‘negative’ symptoms such as avolition or alogia) 
– is caused by an overproduction of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain. Dopamine-carrying neurons 
in this region affect both the limbic system (a brain region implicated in the 
regulation of emotion and motivation) and the prefrontal cortex (implicated 
in the temporal organization of behavior, motivation, and attention). Con-
sequently, unusual dopamine production in the VTA can profoundly affect 
emotion and cognition. 
The view that schizophrenia is primarily caused by an overproduction of 
dopamine is called the ‘dopamine hypothesis’ of schizophrenia (Carlsson 
1974; Pliszka 2003).  Its development helped to promote a largely success-
ful research paradigm that sought the origin of certain mental disorders 
in abnormal neurotransmitter production. It also led many psychiatrists to 
accept the rather simplistic conclusion that schizophrenia stems from a dop-
amine ‘dysfunction.’ 
However, more recently psychiatrists have begun to abandon this model 
and to focus attention on the role of other neurotransmitters in schizophre-
nia, including the neurotransmitter glutamate (Grace 2000; Carlsson 2001). 
Glutamate-carrying neurons in the prefrontal cortex release glutamate onto 
dopamine neurons in the VTA and therefore affect dopaminergic behavior. 
According to one theory, the root neurobiological cause of schizophrenia 
is the underproduction of the transmitter glutamate (‘glutamate hypo-
function’). Heightened dopamine production would merely represent a 
byproduct of the glutamate hypofunction. In this case, while one might say 
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that the glutamate system is ‘dysfunctional,’ the dopamine system is not 
‘dysfunctional’ but rather ‘unable to function normally due to an abnormal 
(glutamatergic) environment.’ This is because, if the glutamate system were 
restored to normal functioning, the dopamine system would resume its nor-
mal functioning as well. Thagard (2003, 244) uses the term ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ malfunction to describe the distinction between the primary locus 
of malfunctioning and the secondary effects of that malfunction. Here the 
term ‘dysfunction’ is used narrowly in the sense of an ‘internal malfunc-
tion.’ 
The failure to attend to this important distinction gave rise to the unwar-
ranted inference that because of unusual levels of dopamine activity in 
schizophrenia, there must be a ‘dysfunction inside’ the dopamine system. 
Psychiatric researchers did not consider the alternate possibility that unusual 
levels of dopamine represent a byproduct of unusually low levels of gluta-
mate. At least in this narrow sense of the term (i.e., ‘internal malfunction’) 
one should not say that the dopamine system is ‘dysfunctional’ but rather 
than it is unable to function normally due to an abnormal neurochemical 
environment. 
The inference that the dopamine system in schizophrenia was ‘dysfunc-
tional’ went hand-in-hand with aggressive pharmaceutical intervention 
targeting the dopamine system (the so-called ‘typical antipsychotics’). Such 
interventions often resulted in disabling extrapyramidal effects, most notori-
ously the Parkinsonian-like dyskinesias. A newer generation of antipsychot-
ics (the ‘atypical’ antipsychotics) target a broader array of neurotransmitters 
and are associated with fewer extrapyramidal effects (e.g., Kapur and See-
man 2001). Consequently, inferences regarding the locus of ‘dysfunction’ 
in the psychiatric context have significant theoretical as well as practical 
bearing.3 This is not to say that an inadequate theory of function is what 
caused researchers to accept the dopamine hypothesis. However, it may 
have contributed to researchers’ failure to explore other alternatives, includ-
ing the possibility that dopamine overproduction was merely a byproduct of 
3 Buller (1997), for example, proposes to define ‘dysfunction’ in terms of the 
target of intervention or repair, thus wedding the definition of ‘dysfunction’ to the 
interventions necessary to ameliorate it.
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a dysfunction in some other part of the brain. 
Equipped with these two points, a concept of biological dysfunction can 
be straightforwardly defined. To say of an individual entity, X, that it is dys-
functional with respect to some activity, F, means that: 
(i) the function of X is F; 
(ii) X is not able to perform F; and 
(iii)  if X is not in the normal environment for its functioning, then if X 
were in the normal environment for its functioning, X would not 
be able to perform F. 
Condition (iii) ensures that X’s inability to perform F is not (merely) due to 
an abnormal environment. 
Two facets of this definition deserve mention before the example of 
schizophrenia is developed in more detail. First, this definition rests cru-
cially on the notion of a ‘normal environment for an entity’s functioning.’ 
From an etiological (historical) perspective, a ‘normal environment for an 
entity’s functioning’ can be taken to refer to the range of environments 
within which the entity’s progenitors performed the activity that currently 
constitutes its function, and in which those performances contributed to the 
differential persistence or differential reproduction of that entity or type 
of entity. (Roughly, this is the range of environments to which the trait 
has been ‘adapted.’) The view that the function of an entity is relative to a 
‘normal environment’ is fairly standard in philosophical discussions of etio-
logical function (e.g., Millikan 1984, 33-4), even if it is left implicit. In fact, 
some notion of a ‘historically normal environment’ has also been invoked in 
the context of consequentialist definitions of function, so it alone does not 
distinguish between the two theories of function (e.g., Boorse 2002, 99).
Secondly, there are two different senses in which a trait can fall outside 
of its ‘normal environment,’ a synchronic sense and a diachronic sense. The 
first, synchronic, sense concerns the way in which the current environment 
of the trait may fall outside of the ‘normal’ range. This would be exhibited 
if a person’s legs were bound by rope or a person were submerged underwa-
ter. The second, diachronic, sense concerns the way in which the trait may 
represent an adaptation to an abnormal past environment that the individual 
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was exposed to. An obvious example would be the use of camouflage in 
changing environments. A chameleon may adapt to changing environments 
by changing color to match its background (e.g., turning green to match 
a green background). However, its ability to change color is fairly limited 
and not as rapid as is commonly believed. Consequently, if its environment 
changes rapidly, that adaptation will no longer serve its function and the 
chameleon will be vulnerable to predation. However, the green skin color 
is not by that token ‘dysfunctional’ in the sense of an internal breakdown. 
Rather, it represents the proper functioning of the pigment rearranging 
mechanism in a changing environment. Similarly, the unusual width of ocu-
lar dominance columns in the kitten’s visual cortex is not dysfunctional, but 
rather represents an adaptation to an unusual formative environment. 
Naturally, not all sorts of environmentally-induced changes represent 
‘adaptations.’ Developing cancer from exposure to environmental car-
cinogens would represent a dysfunction even though it is environmentally 
caused. If a person’s arm is restrained throughout youth and as a conse-
quence he or she loses the use of that arm, this would certainly represent a 
dysfunction even though it was environmentally caused.4 However (as will 
be emphasized below in Section 3) it is important to distinguish environ-
mentally-induced biological changes that represent adaptations and those 
that represent dysfunctions – a distinction which fails to be made in much 
biological research in psychiatry. 
What this section has shown is that, regardless of the specific theory of 
function one accepts, one should be cautious in drawing the conclusion that 
schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction. As long as one’s theory 
of function allows one to draw the distinction between the case in which 
something is dysfunctional, and the case in which it is unable to function 
normally owing to an abnormal environment, then one should exercise 
extreme caution in inferring that a given neurobiological structure is dys-
functional merely because of structural differences. 
4 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that illustration.  
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3. Schizophrenia and the Glutamate System
This section will examine a specific neurochemical hypothesis for schizo-
phrenia called the glutamate hypothesis. According to this view, some of the 
‘positive’ symptoms associated with schizophrenia such as hallucinations or 
delusions are caused by the glutamate system. After introducing the hypoth-
esis, it will present the possibility that the supposed glutamate abnormality 
may result from an adaptive response on the part of the brain to unusual or 
adverse formative experiences, including emotional experiences. Thus, this 
section provides a plausible scenario in which, despite the neurobiologi-
cal differences associated with schizophrenia, nothing ‘within’ the brain is 
dysfunctional at all. The fact that, as will be shown, the data is ambivalent 
between these two possibilities (dysfunction versus adaptation to unusual 
environment) implies that researchers should be much more cautious than 
they currently are in uncritically assuming that schizophrenia must stem 
from an inner ‘dysfunction’ or ‘breakdown.’ 
As noted in the previous section, many psychiatrists have begun to 
emphasize the role of the glutamate system in schizophrenia. Several pieces 
of evidence implicate the underproduction of glutamate in the prefrontal 
cortex. One piece of evidence is that psychostimulants such as PCP inhibit 
the glutamate receptor and produce symptoms analogous to schizophrenia 
(Olney et al. 1999). Secondly, functional imaging studies have implicated 
decreased prefrontal activity in schizophrenia, which would indicate a rela-
tive decrease in glutamate activity in that region (Carlsson and Carlsson 
1990). Thirdly, some preliminary reports suggest that administration of 
glycine, a glutamate receptor agonist, alleviates schizophrenic symptoms 
(Meltzer and Deutch 1999). 
Nonetheless, it would be premature to conclude that hypofunction in the 
glutamate system represents a dysfunction. As an alternative, it may be that 
changes in the glutamate system represent a functional, adaptive response to 
unusual or adverse formative experiences. This latter possibility is rendered 
plausible by considering the role of neural selection processes in shaping 
the mature form of the glutamate system, and the dependence of those pro-
cesses on the individual’s formative environment.  
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The glutamate neurons that are held to be responsible for schizophrenia 
largely reside in the prefrontal cortex of the brain. These neurons release 
glutamate onto dopamine neurons in the VTA, which explains their impor-
tant effect the normal functioning of the dopamine system (Carlsson and 
Carlsson 1990; Grace 1991). Crucially, the shape, number, and connectivity 
of these glutamate-carrying neurons are, at least in part, formed by neural 
selection processes (as described in Section 2.1). In other words, in early 
neurological development there seems to be a ‘hyperabundance’ of connec-
tions between glutamate neurons in the prefrontal cortex; over the course 
of the individual’s cognitive and physical development, some of these con-
nections are retained, and others eliminated. The mature form of the gluta-
mate system is partly the result of the synaptic ‘pruning’ of unnecessary or 
ineffective connections (Keshavan et al. 1994; Lewis 1997; McGlashan and 
Hoffman 2000). 
That the mature form of the glutamate system is shaped by synaptic 
pruning has led some theorists to speculate that an unusually long or ‘exces-
sive’ period of synaptic pruning may lead to a reduction in the number of 
connections between glutamate neurons, and that this reduced connectiv-
ity may result in the glutamate hypofunction implicated in schizophrenia 
(McGlashan and Hoffman 2000; Etienne and Baudry 1990). (See Figure 2.)
The hypothesis that glutamate hypofunction is caused by an unusually 
long or intensive window of synaptic pruning leads to the following ques-
tion: what might be responsible for the unusual duration or intensity of syn-
aptic pruning? As it turns out, the nature and duration of the synaptic prun-
ing process may depend on the individual’s formative experiences including 
emotional experiences (see Figure 3). 
















Fig 2. Proposed relation between synaptic pruning and schizophrenic symptoms.
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neural selection (‘pruning’) in the forebrain may be related to emotional 
experience (Bock and Braun 1998). In newborn chicks, the extent of neural 
pruning in the neostriatum was correlated with the degree of experience 
with a mother surrogate. Experience with the mother surrogate both initi-
ated and shaped the course of synaptic pruning in chicks. Is it overly specu-
lative to suggest, as the authors of this study do, that adverse emotional 
experience in humans may also result in an unusual degree of synaptic 
pruning (Ibid., 25)?
Some psychiatric researchers have acknowledged the possibility that syn-
aptic pruning is controlled in part by the individual’s life experiences, and 
have even suggested that the environmental dependence of synaptic pruning 
provides a way to model the interaction of ‘biological’ and ‘environmental’ 
factors in the etiology of schizophrenia. As Keshavan et al. (1994) note, one 
strength of the pruning model of schizophrenia is that the environmental-
dependence of synaptic pruning would “allow for the integration of psy-
chosocial factors into this pathophysiological model” (Ibid., 257). Moreover, 
they argue, 
“In view of the possibility that experience may influence selective sur-
vival of certain synapses, it is conceivable that genetic abnormalities of 
programmed synaptic pruning processes and adverse life experiences 
in early life could interact to result in pathological brain maturation 
and consequently the schizophrenic diathesis” (Ibid; also see Feinberg 
1982/1983).
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If characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia are partly the result of an 
unusual or adverse formative environment, this raises the possibility that 
the neurobiological differences underlying schizophrenia represent an adap-
tive and functional response to that unusual environment. If this is so, it 
would be inappropriate to say that schizophrenia stems from a biological – 
or even an internal – dysfunction at all, despite the painful or maladaptive 
consequences that the schizophrenic symptoms may have in the life of the 
individual. Rather, the ‘abnormality’ in question would be associated with 
the formative external environment and not with the internal milieu of the 
person with schizophrenia. The development of the visual cortex under 
monocular occlusion constitutes an obvious analogy to the situation. Since 
the evidence is ambivalent between these two possibilities (dysfunction ver-
sus adaptation to an unusual circumstance) one should exercise caution in 
inferring that schizophrenia necessarily stems from an inner dysfunction. 
One potential objection that may be raised here is this: all that the exam-
ple of synaptic pruning has shown is that biological dif ferences underlying 
schizophrenia may be caused, in part, by the environment. That fact would 
not be terribly surprising because other disorders have also been shown to 
have an environmental component (e.g., Caspi et al. 2003). In particular, 
it has not been shown why these differences should be seen as adaptive 
or functional. The mere fact that a neurobiological change is environmen-
tally caused does not imply that it is functional or adaptive. For example, 
inhaling lighter fluid can cause massive dysfunction in neurons throughout 
the prefrontal cortex. There is nothing functional or adaptive about that 
response. 
It is true that the brain may respond in many different ways to environ-
mental insults. On the one hand, the inhalation of lighter fluid may cause 
massive cellular dysfunction. On the other hand, in addition to the cellular 
dysfunction, there may also be secondary responses that are functional 
and adaptive, and that contribute to healing. For example, the inhalation of 
lighter fluid will also cause blood to rush to affected regions to bring nutri-
ents to vulnerable neurons. Environmental shocks or traumas may cause 
both dysfunctional as well as functional responses. The problem is that it is 
often difficult to tell whether a given part of the brain is dysfunctional or 
whether it is responding in an adaptive and functional manner to changing 
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circumstances. After all, the modus operandi of the brain is to reorganize 
itself in response to novel environmental demands. As a consequence, what 
the example regarding synaptic pruning shows is that one must exhibit 
extreme caution in making the inference that a neurobiological difference 
represents a dysfunction. This is particularly so when the presence or the 
absence of the change appears to be systematically dependent on the life 
history of the individual. Given the environmental-dependence of schizo-
phrenia, much more research would need to be conducted before embracing 
the conclusion that it represents an inner dysfunction. 
To reiterate, the purpose of this section is not to present evidence that 
schizophrenia is functional and adaptive rather than dysfunctional. The 
purpose is to show that given a plausible theory of function, the evidence 
for a ‘dysfunction’ is highly ambivalent between the claim that schizophre-
nia represents a dysfunction and the claim that it represents an adaptive 
response to an unusual environment. The fact that schizophrenia seems to 
exhibit a strong environmental-dependence, and that the brain is constantly 
reorganizing itself to adapt to environmental challenges, shows that this is a 
plausible alternative to the ‘dysfunction’ theory. 
A second objection would be based upon the supposed genetic compo-
nents of schizophrenia. According to this objection, schizophrenia has been 
shown to have a genetic component, and the existence of this genetic com-
ponent reveals that it stems from an internal dysfunction. However, there 
are two problems with this objection. The first is that evidence for a genetic 
basis for schizophrenia is highly ambivalent. Although many believe it to 
be influenced genetically (Moises and Gottesman 2001; Tsuang 2000), it 
certainly does not follow a classic Mendelian pattern of inheritance, and 
attempts to localize specific genes have not been successfully replicated 
(Riley and McGuffin 2000; Torrey and Yolken 2000; see Sarkar 1998 
for general problems with attempts to ‘reduce’ complex psychological or 
behavioral traits to genes). But a second problem is more significant. Even 
if schizophrenia has a genetic component, that does not imply that it stems 
from a dysfunction. After all, many unusual or statistically rare phenotypes 
have a genetic component but are not dysfunctional, such as red hair or 
green eyes (e.g., Lloyd 1998). In order to determine that schizophrenia stems 
from a genetic dysfunction one would have to ascertain, first, the function 
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of the relevant gene, and second, that the variant associated with schizo-
phrenia prevents that function from being carried out. For example, if there 
is a sequence of DNA that has the function of regulating the connectivity of 
glutamate neurons in the prefrontal cortex, and if schizophrenia stems from 
a mutation that prevents this function from being executed, then it would 
be true to say that schizophrenia stems from a dysfunction. However, none 
of this could be inferred without further evidence. 
The possibility that changes to the glutamate system in schizophrenia may 
have functional or adaptive significance is not proposed here as an ascer-
tained fact. Rather, it is merely suggested as a plausible hypothesis given 
what is known about common neurobiological processes – one that could 
be progressively confirmed, or disconfirmed, in the face of future evidence. 
However, to the extent that this hypothesis is plausible, then one cannot 
infer merely from the presence of neurobiological differences associated 
with schizophrenia that schizophrenia stems from a biological ‘dysfunction.’ 
Unfortunately, that is precisely the inference that psychiatrists and neurosci-
entists routinely make.  
The pertinent analogy here is to the unusual structure of the visual cortex 
of kittens raised in conditions of monocular occlusion. Of course, the differ-
ence between the cases is that in the latter case, the functional and adaptive 
value of the unusual structure is known: it maximizes the kitten’s power of 
visual discrimination. The possible functional or adaptive role of glutamate 
differences underlying schizophrenia is unknown, although such an adap-
tive role is not inconceivable. For example, one theory of schizophrenia that 
was prominent in the 1960s was the ‘double-bind’ theory associated with the 
work of Gregory Bateson and colleagues (e.g., Bateson et al. 1956), accord-
ing to which schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions and hallucina-
tions, catatonia, and disorganized thought can be understood as intelligible 
responses to conflicting demands that are imposed upon a person (typically 
by the family) each of which is associated with punishment and which 
jointly admit of no satisfactory resolution. Delusion, in this view, represents 
an attempt to ‘escape’ these conflicting demands. Of course, this paper is 
not endorsing Bateson’s ‘double-bind’ theory. The point, however, is that the 
supposition that symptoms associated with schizophrenia have adaptive sig-
nificance is not beyond the realm of plausibility. 
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4. Implications for Research and Treatment
One might argue that this thesis – that one should be cautious in conclud-
ing that schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction – is relatively 
trivial. Who cares if mental disorders do not stem from ‘biological dysfunc-
tions,’ according to some philosophical definition of ‘function’? After all, 
psychiatrists have found evidence of important and substantial biological 
differences between the brains of people who do, and do not, have schizo-
phrenia. Secondly, it is agreed that schizophrenia is dysfunctional in the 
sense of ‘socially dysfunctional.’ Furthermore, schizophrenia, whatever its 
basis, can be a horrifying condition – both for the person so afflicted as well 
as that person’s friends and family – one that hopefully will someday be 
eradicated by the advent of pharmacological and other forms of treatment. 
It is still a great victory for biological psychiatry that schizophrenia, and 
other severe mental disorders, can safely be said to stem from biological 
‘abnormalities,’ or to represent ‘unfortunate biological conditions,’ and that 
many can be treated pharmacologically. So, one might argue, why should it 
matter whether or not schizophrenia can be said to stem from a ‘biological 
dysfunction’? 
The reason it matters is that the language of ‘dysfunction’ in psychia-
try is powerful and significant. Whether or not the brain can be said to be 
‘dysfunctional’ in the case of a severe mental disorder has a tremendous 
bearing on the way that mental disorders are conceptualized in psychiatric 
practice, as well as perceived among the public. On the surface of it, to 
say that someone has a mental disorder is often to say that something has 
gone ‘wrong,’ as it were, inside the person. The idea that nature has in some 
sense ‘erred’ in the brain of a person with a mental disorder bears, for many, 
an unmistakable intuitive appeal. It is only natural, then, to want to ‘look 
inside’ the person and find out what ‘went wrong.’ The language of inner 
‘dysfunctions,’ then, supports individualistic models of psychiatry that look 
‘inside’ the person rather than ‘outside’ the person to his or her environment. 
This has the unfortunate consequence of potentially restricting research and 
medical attention solely to the biological processes implicated in schizo-
phrenia, and to downplay or ignore other relevant factors such as cognitive-
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behavioral, social, or environmental ones. 
It is, of course, empirically possible that schizophrenia, along with other 
major mental disorders, will be shown unequivocally to stem from internal 
dysfunctions. But it is also empirically conceivable, and consistent with 
current evidence, that it does not stem from an inner dysfunction. The mere 
fact that the ‘dysfunction’ label tends to have a restrictive effect on research 
and treatment norms suggests that psychiatrists and researchers should be 
more cautious in the use of that label than they currently are. 
Suppose, furthermore, that one does not say that mental disorders stem 
from biological dysfunctions, but rather, one merely states that they have 
biological ‘causes,’ or that they stem from ‘unusual biological conditions,’ 
or simply that the brains of some people with mental disorders are ‘differ-
ent’ from the brains of those without? These statements do not carry the 
same normative weight because they are not accompanied by the implicit 
suggestion that anything in the brain has ‘gone wrong.’ The suggestion that 
the neurobiology underlying some forms of schizophrenia reveals an ‘adap-
tive response of the brain to an unusual formative environment’ may, in 
fact, encourage researchers to explore the complex interactions between life 
experience and brain development that may contribute to schizophrenia and 
other major mental disorders (e.g., Caspi et al. 2003). Taking this perspec-
tive to an extreme, one might suggest that the unusual biological formations 
associated with schizophrenia represent a creative triumph of the human 
brain to adapt to unusual or adverse events.
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